Is a Release and Waiver of Liability Enforceable in California?
In the recent appellate decision in Diamond v. Schweitzer, Plaintiff Zackary Diamond appealed from a judgment entered after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants Scott Schweitzer, Schweitzer Motorsports Productions doing business as Bakersfield Speedway, and Christian Schweitzer, an individual doing business as Starting Line Refreshments.
Plaintiff suffered injuries from a punch inflicted by a third party during an altercation in the restricted pit area at Bakersfield Speedway.
Plaintiff alleges defendants were negligent in failing to provide reasonable security, adequately responding to the altercation, and undertaking reasonable rescue efforts.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred by the release and waiver of liability form he signed to gain admission to the pit area.
The trial court granted the motion, concluding the release’s language was clear, unequivocal, broad in scope, and included the negligent conduct alleged in this case. The court interpreted the release as including risks arising out of or related to racing activities. It concluded the assault was such a risk and, thus, was the type of event anticipated and covered by the release.
On appeal, plaintiff contended the release is unenforceable because the injury- producing act of negligence was not reasonably related to the purpose for which he signed the release, which he describes as observing the race up close from the restricted pit area while it was occurring.
In addition, the parties responded to this court’s request for supplemental briefing regarding whether plaintiff pled a theory of gross negligence and whether that theory was or was not subject to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The appellate court concluded the requirements for an enforceable release have been met:
(1) the release contains a clear, unambiguous and explicit expression of the parties’ intent to release all liability for plaintiff’s injury;
(2) the alleged acts of negligence resulting in the injury are reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was given; and
(3) the release does not contravene public policy.
It also concluded defendants adequately raised a complete defense based on the signed release of liability to all theories of negligence alleged in the complaint, and plaintiff failed to rebut that defense in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
In March 2020, plaintiff, through Linda Valdez, his guardian ad litem, filed a complaint for damages against defendants,alleging causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, (3) negligent hiring, selection, approval, retention, and supervision, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants breached their duty of care by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure plaintiff’s safety from dangerous conditions while attending a June 9, 2018, racing event at defendants’ raceway.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants negligently failed to provide adequate security or supervision, including by failing to hire, train, and supervise adequate security staff where plaintiff observed the events that day, respond to the ongoing fight that resulted in plaintiff’s injury, and undertake appropriate rescue efforts.
Defendants answered the complaint with a general denial, and the seventh affirmative defense alleged that plaintiff expressly in writing waived and released all liability against them based on their alleged negligence, agreed to indemnify and hold them harmless, and assumed all risks and dangers “broadly associated” with attending the event.
In January 2022, defendants filed and served a motion for summary judgment, or, alternatively, summary adjudication. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in December 2022, and entered judgment in defendants’ favor. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
Plaintiff attended the June 9, 2018, races at the raceway with his mother, Linda Valdez, to watch his brother, Jacob Diamond, and his stepfather, Daniel Valdez, race Modlite cars. Plaintiff watched the races with his mother from the pit area. David Hays, his wife, Sonja Hays, and Sonja’s son, Kyle Flippo, were present in the pit area, too.
After a race finished, David Hays, upset over Jacob Diamond’s driving, confronted Jacob, yelling at him and using profanity. Plaintiff and his mother arrived, and David began yelling at them, with his wife, Sonja, joining in. The altercation ended without violence.
When plaintiff Linda Valdez later returned to the pit area, Sonja Hays started another verbal altercation that escalated, with Sonja charging Linda Valdez and shoving her with both hands. David Hays lunged between the two women and shoved Linda to the ground.
Seeing this, plaintiff ran to his mother, but Kyle Flippo intercepted him and punched his chin. Plaintiff fell to the ground, cracking his skull in three places upon impact and causing subdural and internal bleeding.
Defendants’ asserted they were entitled to summary judgment, in relevant part, because plaintiff signed an express waiver, release, and assumption of risk prior to attending the racing event where he was injured.
Defendants argued the release precluded plaintiff from establishing that defendants owed him any duty, a necessary element for his negligence causes of action. Defendants argued that the release broadly covered any negligence, including negligent rescue operations, and injuries that might be sustained in restricted areas like the pit, even if the injured party might not know of that particular risk. Defendants argued that the release did not violate public policy and was thus enforceable.
Plaintiff’s separate statement in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment disputed defendants’ assertion that he released them from liability “for injuries he might sustain during the running of the race event if caused by negligence and negligent rescue operations.”
Plaintiff interpreted the release to mean (1) he “released only Scott Schweitzer and Schweitzer Motorsports Productions,” not all defendants, and (2) those two defendants were released only from liability for “injuries arising from or relating to the event(s).”
Plaintiff’s separate statement asserted he “was not injured during the running of a race event or while engaged in any activity associated with the operation of a motor vehicle” but rather by “[a] violent attack” that was “not reasonably related to racing or the running of a racing event.”
Plaintiff also asserted no races were in progress when Kyle Flippo blindsided him with a punch.
Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities contended the required act of negligence resulting in the injury “be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was signed.”
Plaintiff argued that the act of punching another person was “not reasonably related to the purpose for which [he] signed the release—to watch racing in the pits.”
Defendants asserted plaintiff’s injuries were covered by the release because the injuries arose out of or were related to the racing activities. Defendants argued the fight occurred because there had been a race and those involved in the fight were with teams or were related to the drivers and the argument arose over what happened on the track. Thus, defendants concluded the fight would not have occurred without racing. Defendants distinguish Sweat by asserting there was no true relationship between the integrity of the bleachers and racing—that is, the collapse of the bleachers was not a race- dependent incident.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, and (3) negligent hiring, selection, approval, retention, and supervision.
Each of these causes of action is based on the elements of negligence. (See Civ. Code,
§ 1714, subd. (a) [all persons are legally responsible “for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property”].)
A release need not be perfect to be enforceable.
A release must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the parties’ intent by stating the language used must be clear, explicit and comprehensible in each of its essential details. Such an agreement, read as a whole, must clearly notify the prospective releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the agreement.
Any ambiguity in a release is usually construed against its drafter.
Whether the provisions of a contract, including a release, are clear and unambiguous is a question of law, not of fact.
The language in a contract cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.
The language “‘must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of that case.
Generally, contractual language is interpreted in its “ordinary and popular sense.” (Civ. Code, § 1644.)
Courts often look to dictionary definitions for a word’s ordinary and popular meaning.
Under these principles, a disagreement concerning the meaning of a word or phrase, or the fact that a word or phrase isolated from its context is susceptible to more than one meaning, does not make the language ambiguous.
The first numbered paragraph of the release supports a broad interpretation of the term “related.” That paragraph required plaintiff to immediately advise officials and, if necessary, leave a restricted area if “he feels anything to be unsafe.” The pit area in which plaintiff was injured was a restricted area. The word “anything” is broad and, therefore, the paragraph does not expressly or impliedly restrict the release’s scope.
The use of “arising out of or related to” is broad, not narrow, and does not create an ambiguity. It encompasses injuries having a causal connection to the events or having a logical connection to the events.
The release does not define the term “EVENT(S).” However, immediately below its title, the release has a blank line for a “DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF SCHEDULED EVENTS.” Handwritten above that line is the venue’s name: “Bakersfield Speedway.” On the blank line for “DATE RELEASE SIGNED” is handwritten “June 9, ’18.” Thus, the release identified the location and date, but did not specifically describe the scheduled events.
Based on the way the release was filled out, the dictionary definitions, and the case law, the term “EVENT(S)” is not ambiguous in the context of this case. It refers to the races held at the Bakersfield Speedway on June 9, 2018.
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, the appellate court found as a matter of law that plaintiff’s injury is “related to” the races. In particular, the facts establish the “but for” test for a causal connection is satisfied.
But for the races, plaintiff and Kyle Flippo would not have been in the speedway’s pit area on that date and, as a result, the altercations in the pit area that resulted in plaintiff being punched would not have occurred.
A direct causal link to the racing activity is not required by the release’s “related to” language.
Thus, the indirect link between the races and the incident supplies the requisite connection.
Here, the release and waiver provision explicitly refers to any injury “CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.” The assumption of risk provision uses the same language. The release used the term “negligence” a total of four times and “NEGLIGENT RESCUE OPERATIONS” twice. Consequently, the release’s language is sufficient to include negligence in providing security for the events and, thus, meets the requirement of being explicit in expressing the intent of the parties.
Further, the last portion of the Agreement indicates that [the plaintiff] intended his signature to be ‘A COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL LIABILITY TO THE GREATEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW.’ Even when strictly construed against Wiscasset Raceway, the Agreement ‘expressly spell[s] out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability.’”
If the negligent act is so related then, as a matter of law, it is reasonably foreseeable whether or not it was actually in the contemplation of either party.
The scope of a release generally determines whether negligent conduct reasonably relates to the “object or purpose for which the release was given.”
Though the release must apply to the negligence at issue, it need not specify every possible specific act of negligence.
Nor is it relevant whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the recreational activity to which the release applies, but rather the scope of the release.
Because the release at issue specifically mentions the activities for which plaintiff sought entrance to the venue— observation of the race—the purpose and object of the release clearly relates to the alleged negligence arising out of conduct related to the race.
Defendants’ alleged negligence in providing security at the racing events on June 9, 2018, is reasonably related to the release’s purpose.
The release is worded, as noted above, to obtain a broad, unconditional waiver of any liability for injuries directly and indirectly arising from or related to attendance at the event on June 9, 2018, and caused by defendants’ negligence.
The purpose of the release was clearly to obtain entry to the venue, including the pit area.
Plaintiff undisputedly sought entry to the event, generally, and the pit area, specifically, to participate in the event, and, per the release’s terminology, “observe” his brother race. Plaintiff wrote in the word “pit” after his signature and under the column in the release titled “duties.”
His additional material facts assert he entered the speedway “through the pits to assist his brother and stepfather before their race.” This assertion clearly indicates plaintiff signed the release to not only observe but participate in the preparation for his family members’ race that day. After the race, he was injured during an altercation about his brother’s racing conduct. All participants in that altercation were in the pit area for the express purpose of attending the race.
Altercations about a sporting event are reasonably related to the purpose and object of a release that exchanges a release of liability for entry to the racing event. Applied here, the altercation about his brother’s racing conduct was reasonably related to the purpose or object of the release: to gain entry to the venue to observe the event.
Exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy.
California courts, including the Supreme Court, have manifestly concluded categorically that private agreements made in the recreational sports context releasing liability for future ordinary negligence do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy.
Obviously, no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other party.
The release does not involve a transaction that affects the public interest, and the release’s enforcement does not contravene public policy.
LESSONS:
1. Many tickets to sporting events set forth a release and waiver of liability.
2. The requirements for an enforceable release are:
(1) the release contains a clear, unambiguous and explicit expression of the parties’ intent to release all liability for plaintiff’s injury;
(2) the alleged acts of negligence resulting in the injury are reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was given; and
(3) the release does not contravene public policy.
3. A release must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the parties’ intent by stating the language used must be clear, explicit and comprehensible in each of its essential details. Such an agreement, read as a whole, must clearly notify the prospective releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the agreement.
4. All persons are legally responsible “or an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property.
5. Exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy.