How Does California's Anti-SLAPP Statute Affect an Unlawful Detainer Action?
At issue in the recent appellate decision of Noon v. Fuentes, is whether a landlord who wrongfully evicts tenants from six of his units, without notice, is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because he filed an unlawful detainer action against the tenant of a seventh unit who, alone, was behind on her rent.
The appellate court held this conduct was not protected.
Plaintiffs and appellants Lucie Noon (Noon), Hugo Batres (Hugo), Haroldo Batres (Haroldo),1 Rigoberto Mena (Mena), and Tolentino Sales (Sales) (appellants) rented units one, three, four, five, and six in a building (the Property) owned by defendant and respondent Fermin Fuentes.
In July 2022, they were forced from their homes when sheriff’s deputies executed a writ of possession after Fuentes obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment against the tenant of unit seven.
Appellants sued Fuentes for wrongful eviction and other claims, alleging he concealed the unlawful detainer proceedings from them and unlawfully terminated their tenancies.
Fuentes filed a special motion to strike the operative first amended complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, arguing that all of appellants’ claims arise from protected activity—the prosecution of an unlawful detainer action.
The trial court granted the motion as to 10 of appellants’ 11 causes of action, and they appealed.
The Property, located at 1210 Magnolia Avenue in Los Angeles, is a “large single family home” subdivided into at least seven units. Appellants allege the Property is subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO, Los Angeles Mun. Code, §§ 151.00, et seq.) which permits evictions only in 14 enumerated circumstances3 and only where the landlord complies with specific notice requirements.
With the exception of brothers Hugo and Haroldo, appellants did not know each other before renting their units. None of the appellants was a subtenant.
Each rented directly from Fuentes under separate oral lease agreements and moved into their numbered units at different times.
Each paid monthly rent to Fuentes in differing amounts, and some paid security deposits.
A landlord’s failure to satisfy the eviction requirements in LARSO provides the tenant with an affirmative defense to the former’s unlawful detainer action.
In September 2021, Fuentes informed appellants he was selling the Property and told them they had to vacate within 60 days. He offered appellants “cash for key[s].”
When none of them accepted, he began “a campaign of harassment and threats to force [them] to vacate.”
In November 2021, Fuentes filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Cisneros alleging nonpayment of rent. Though Cisneros was the only tenant behind on rent, Fuentes sought possession of the entire Property, not just unit seven. Around this time, Fuentes removed the unit numbers from the apartment doors.
Appellants were never served with the unlawful detainer and knew nothing of the eviction action against Cisneros.
Fuentes purported to serve Cisneros by delivering papers to someone named “Maria Lopez,” who did not live at the Property.
Appellants suspected nothing and restored the unit numbers to their doors.
Fuentes secured defaults against the unlawful detainer defendants in February and May 2022, respectively, but never served the requests for default on appellants.
Fuentes again removed the unit numbers from the doors to “g[i]ve the impression that the . . . Property was one single family home rather than the multi-unit property he created and rented.”
On May 9, 2022, Fuentes obtained a judgment of possession against Cisneros and unnamed occupants. The judgment described the entire Property, not just unit seven. Fuentes did not notify appellants of the judgment. Soon after, he requested and obtained a writ of possession for the entire Property.
On July 6, 2022, sheriff’s deputies executed the writ and ordered appellants from the Property.
Fuentes did not inform deputies that the writ should apply only to unit seven, that there were multiple units at the Property, and that appellants were not included in the unlawful detainer case.
Appellants allege they had not seen or been served with a notice to vacate, and some of them had paid rent for July 2022.
Appellants became homeless and were unable to retrieve most of their personal property.
Subsequently, appellants checked with the court but were told there were no evictions against them.
In July 2023, appellants filed this action and thereafter, filed the first amended complaint. They assert causes of action for (1) wrongful eviction; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (tort); (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (statute); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); (5) violation of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 15610.30; (6) forcible entry; (7) forcible detainer; (8) violation of Civil Code, section 1950.5; (9) fraud; (10) violation of Civil Code, section 789.3; and (11) violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code, section 17200, et seq.
Fuentes filed a special motion to strike all of the causes of action. He argued that appellants’ claims arose from the unlawful detainer case, which was protected activity. He also argued that appellants could not demonstrate their claims have at least minimal merit.
The proofs of service of the summons, complaint, and prejudgment claim of right to possession form state that copies of these papers were left with a “Maria Lopez,” but again, there is no mention of appellants or any indication that the documents were mailed to their units.
Appellants also were not listed among the persons to whom the requests for entry of default were mailed, and Fuentes’s counsel did not represent that copies were mailed to their units.
On May 12, 2022, a clerk’s default judgment was entered against Cisneros and all occupants of the premises.
The same day, Fuentes applied for and obtained a writ of possession, listing Cisneros as the judgment debtor and omitting unit seven from the address of the premises.
Appellants attested that when sheriff’s deputies executed the writ of possession on July 6, 2022, they were unaware of the unlawful detainer case. They had not seen Cisneros at the Property for more than a year, and never knew a tenant named Maria Lopez.
The trial court was persuaded that appellants were actually parties to the unlawful detainer action, even though Fuentes had alleged nonpayment of the rent that was due under the lease of unit seven only.
The court found appellants’ allegation that the unlawful detainer action against another tenant was inconsistent with the allegation that Fuentes obtained a judgment against Cisneros and unnamed occupants. Fuentes’s action, the court reasoned, was protected activity under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.
Appellants argued that this case is based on the fraudulent termination of a tenancy.
They argued that they are seeking redress because Fuentes terminated their tenancies and effectuated an eviction without resorting to the judicial process—which, if anything, is the opposite of petitioning activity.”
The appellate court agreed.
A tenant’s complaint against a landlord filed after the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer does not arise from those particular activities if the gravamen of the tenant’s complaint challenges the decision to terminate the tenancy or other conduct in connection with the termination apart from the filing of an unlawful detainer complaint.
Terminating a tenancy or removing a property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech.
Here, the gravamen of appellant’s claims is not Fuentes’s filing or prosecuting the unlawful detainer against the tenants of unit seven, but rather, his improper termination of appellants’ tenancies to accommodate a sale of the Property.
Appellants’ wrongful eviction claim requires them to establish their peaceable possession of their units and Fuentes’s forcible entry.
If a tenant is forcibly removed from premises without judicial process, such tenant can sue for wrongful eviction and obtain damages.
The appellate court could not find from the record that appellants were parties to the unlawful detainer action against Cisneros and unnamed occupants.
First, the only basis for the unlawful detainer action was the alleged nonpayment of rent as to unit seven.
That allegation could not support the eviction of tenants arise from protected activity.
The mere fact that a claim may have been triggered by protected activity (such as service of unlawful detainer papers) does not necessarily mean it arose from that activity.
Nor were the appellants lawfully served and given notice as unnamed occupants.
The unlawful detainer complaint itself defines the unnamed defendants as “subtenants.” None of appellants, apparently, were subtenants, as they had individual rental agreements with Fuentes for separate units.
Indeed, the written lease agreement with Cisneros defined the premises she was renting as “Apt. No. 7.” The only “unnamed occupants” legally served with the unlawful detainer action would have been unnamed occupants of unit seven.
Appellants’ allegations and evidence indicate they were occupying units in a multi-unit building pursuant to separate rental agreements. Fuentes’s stated reason for wanting appellants to vacate—to facilitate his sale of the Property—was not a reason for eviction permitted by the LARSO, and his cash for keys offers suggest that he understood this.
Appellants allege that when he could not convince them to leave voluntarily, Fuentes resorted to deceptive and fraudulent conduct to terminate their tenancies in violation of LARSO.
Fuentes first concealed the unlawful detainer actions from appellants and removed indicia of multiple living units from the premises before the sheriff’s lockout. When the sheriff’s deputies arrived to evict appellants, they were misled by Fuentes into believing that the apartment building was merely one unit and that the writ of possession applied to appellants.
In response to Haroldo’s truthful statement to a sheriff’s deputy that he had not received anything from the court, Fuentes’ falsely stated that Haroldo was “playing games,” misleading the deputy into believing the writ required the lockout of not only Cisneros, but appellants too.
These acts do not arise from filing and prosecuting the unlawful detainer case against the tenants of unit seven, which was merely one “step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.
In the claims for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the unlawful termination of appellants’ tenancies is the alleged act of breach. In the IIED claim, the same conduct is alleged to have caused appellants emotional distress.
In the elder abuse claim, Mena alleged this conduct constituted the taking of his property with fraudulent intent.
The same conduct supplied the elements of a forcible entry and forcible detainer, as required by these causes of action.
In the fraud claim, appellants rely on Fuentes’s concealing the unlawful detainer proceedings to establish the element of concealment or suppression of a material fact.
The above-described conduct is alleged to be the means by which Fuentes prevented appellants from gaining reasonable access to their units in violation of Civil Code, section 789.3(b)(1).
Finally, the same conduct was the basis for appellants’ UCL cause of action, which alleged that Fuentes engaged in unlawful business practices by violating Civil Code sections 1927 and the provisions of the LARSO provisions governing evictions
In sum, Fuentes failed to demonstrate that any of these causes of action is based on the unlawful detainer action. He failed to carry his first prong burden.
LESSONS:
1. Terminating a tenancy or removing a property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech.
2. A tenant’s complaint against a landlord filed after the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer does not arise from those particular activities if the gravamen of the tenant’s complaint challenges the decision to terminate the tenancy or other conduct in connection with the termination apart from the filing of an unlawful detainer complaint.
3. If a tenant is forcibly removed from premises without judicial process, such tenant can sue for wrongful eviction and obtain damages.